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The amount of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) available to low- and middle-income countries
has increased exponentially over the past decade. However, there are concerns that DAH increases have
not resulted in increased spending on health at the country level. This is because DAH may be fungible,
resulting from the recipient government decreasing its contribution to the health sector as a result of
external funding. The aim of this research is to assess whether DAH funds in Tanzania are fungible, by
exploring government substitution of its own resources across sectors and within the health sector.
A database containing 28140 projects of DAH expenditure between 2000 and 2010 was compiled from
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Creditor Reporting System (OECD-CRS)
and AidData databases. Government health expenditure data for the same period were obtained from the
Government of Tanzania, World Bank, public expenditure reviews and budget speeches and analysed to
assess the degree of government substitution. 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted with
Development Partners (DPs), government and non-government stakeholders between April and June
2012 to explore stakeholder perceptions of fungibility.
We found some evidence of substitution of government funds at the health sector and sub-sector
levels and two mechanisms through which it takes place: the resource allocation process and macro-
economic factors. We found fungibility of external funds may not necessarily be detrimental to Tanza-
nia’s development (as evidence suggests the funds displaced may be reallocated to education) and the
mechanisms used by DPs to prevent substitution were largely ineffective.
We recommend DPs engage more effectively in the priority-setting process, not just with the Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), but also with the Ministry of Finance, to agree on priorities and
mutual funding responsibilities at a macroeconomic level. We also call for more qualitative research on
fungibility.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The amount of Development Assistance for Health (DAH)
available to low- and middle-income countries has more than
doubled from $15.3 billion in 2004 to $35.9 billion in 2014
(Dieleman et al., 2013). This substantial increase has led some to
explore whether DAH is fungible (capable of being substituted) or
additive to the overall allocation to the health sector within.ac.uk (M. Martínez Alvarez),
rya@thepalladiumgroup.com
r Ltd. This is an open access articlecountries (Dieleman and Hanlon, 2013; Pack and Pack, 1993). While
somemay argue fungibility is a rational response of countries faced
with sub-optimal external aid allocations (McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2000), others see it as a threat to meeting global tar-
gets on investment in health (Lu et al., 2010). In this latter respect,
the current emphasis on achieving universal health coverage and
ﬁnancing the Sustainable Development Goals have focussed
attention on domestic contributions to the health sector (United
Nations, 2015), and several Development Partners (DPs) are work-
ing on co-ﬁnancing agreements before DAH is provided (The Global
Fund to ﬁght AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2013). Exploring the
extent towhich DAH is fungible is therefore timely, as is the need to
understand its causes and why it arises, both to assist those tryingunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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rational response to increases in DAH.
There have been various attempts to study DAH fungibility, both
from the sector (Dieleman and Hanlon, 2013; Farag et al., 2009; Lu
et al., 2010) and sub-sector levels (Harper, 2012; Shiffman, 2008). In
the health literature fungibility is typically deﬁned as the non-
additionality of DAH, where DAH is spent in the health sector, but
the recipient government substitutes its own resources to other
priorities (Morrissey, 2006). However, there is no consensus on a
measure of fungibility, or a threshold beyond which DAH is
considered fungible. Many studies have assessed the degree of DAH
fungibility by asking the question: does an extra dollar of DAH
result in an extra dollar of health expenditure by the government?
To answer this question, most studies have used multi-country
data, running regressions to assess the relationship between DAH
and government health expenditure across different time points
(Dieleman and Hanlon, 2013; Farag et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2010;
Stuckler, Basu and McKee, 2011; Van de Sijpe, 2013). These
studies generally conclude DAH is fungible, although the magni-
tude of the effect varies between a US$0.27-US$1.65 decrease in
domestic expenditure on health per dollar of DAH. There has been
some debate as to the validity of these studies due to concerns
about the accuracy and completeness of the data they are based on,
their methodological approaches, including their handling of
missing data and regression models, as well as the risk of endo-
geneity and ambiguity as to the direction of causality (Ooms et al.,
2010; Roodman, 2012; Sridhar andWoods, 2010). Although some of
the authors have responded to these criticisms (Dieleman et al.,
2013), doubts remain on whether cross-country studies can
disprove the null hypothesis (that DAH is not fungible). Further,
these studies highlight the heterogeneity of results across countries
(Jones, 2005; Ooms et al., 2010), but, generally do not examine the
drivers of these differences. There is therefore a need to go beyond
cross-country analyses and investigate DAH fungibility from the
perspective of a recipient country, and explore the mechanisms
behind the broader econometric ﬁndings using quantitative and
qualitative methods.
There has been one country case study of DAH fungibility in
Vietnam, which analysed the effect of two World Bank health
projects on government expenditure, and found DAH was not
fungible between sectors, but was fungible within the health sector
across provinces (Wagstaff, 2011). However, this study did not
explore the reasons that led to fungibility. Further, three case
studies examining the additionality of HIV development expendi-
tures in Honduras, Rwanda and Thailand found no evidence of
government substitution, but did ﬁnd DPs substituted their HIV
funding to other priorities as a response of increased HIV funding
from the Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and Malaria (Garg et al.,
2012). There is therefore a dearth of data on country level factors
that may lead to fungibility, the mechanisms through which it oc-
curs and the implications it has for health policy; although these
are recognized to be essential to understand fungibility (Harper,
2012). Addressing this gap can help those designing strategies to
deal with fungibility, including changing the channel and mecha-
nisms of DAH disbursement or co-ﬁnancing arrangements
(Leiderer, 2012; The Global Fund to ﬁght AIDS Tuberculosis and
Malaria, 2013).
This study intends to address some of these knowledge gaps by
using the Tanzanian health sector as a case study. We ﬁrst use a mix
of quantitative and qualitative methods to assess whether trends
on domestic and external expenditures in Tanzania are consistent
with DAH fungibility. We then explore qualitatively the perceptions
of stakeholders on the processes that may lead to substitution of
government funds.2. Study setting
Tanzania (mainland) was selected as the case study country
because it is one of the top recipients of DAH globally and is heavily
dependent on external health funding, which accounted for
30e48% of total health expenditure between 2003 and 2013 (Wolrd
Health Organisation, 2015).
A multitude of actors are active in the Tanzanian health sector.
These include DPs: bi-lateral andmulti-lateral agencies, and private
foundations; all levels of government: Ministry of Finance, Prime
Minister’s Ofﬁce Regional Administration and Local Government
(PMO-RALG), Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) and
regional and council health management teams; and non-
government agencies, including faith-based organisations, civil
society organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and
the private, for proﬁt sector.
The Tanzanian health sector is funded from a mix of domestic
and external funds. Domestic funds are mainly generated through
taxation. DPs funding the health sector directly do so using three
different modalities. The ﬁrst is the basket fund, which was
established in 1999 and is earmarked pooled health sector funding
allocated to the MoHSW, PMO-RALG and regional and local au-
thorities. In addition, DPs provide funding for vertical projects
directly to the MoHSW, regions and districts; and off-budget funds
channelled through non-government agencies. Finally, from 2001
DPs have been providing unmarked General Budget Support (GBS)
to the Ministry of Finance.
DPs and the government have worked under a Sector Wide
Approach (SWAP) in the health sector since 1998, with the aim of
alignment in support of the government’s health and ﬁnancing
policies, using harmonised procedures and country public ﬁnancial
management systems (Hobbs, 2001). The Tanzanian health sector
underwent a decentralisation reform in 1994, known as “Decen-
tralisation by Devolution” that decentralised ﬁnancial and budg-
eting to the district level (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare,
2008).
3. Methods
3.1. Methodological approach
Given the lack of sufﬁcient historical data on domestic and
external health ﬁnancing and difﬁculty in controlling confounders,
we did not seek to quantitatively establish a causal relationship on
whether DAH results in substitution. Instead, we ﬁrst provide a
descriptive (primarily correlative) account of domestic and external
health expenditure trends as sources and agents, where we
compare trends in total domestic and external health expenditure
and the relative shares each represent to give an indication of how
they change in relation to each other and as an overall priority to
DPs and government. Although descriptive in nature, these ana-
lyses allow for the exploration of potential substitution across
sectors and sub-sectors. This is complemented through in-depth
interviews exploring possible explanations for the trends, and
mechanisms of possible causality, including a focus on stake-
holders’ perceptions on whether fungibility is taking place in the
Tanzanian health sector. This is used to develop an in-depth
exploration of the potential mechanisms and governmental pro-
cesses that may lead to DAH fungibility in an effort to unpack the
potential causal pathway.
We used a modiﬁed sequential transformative strategy to
combine quantitative and qualitative methods, as described by
Creswell (2003). This strategy involves carrying out the two
methods in sequential stages of data collection (quantitative fol-
lowed by qualitative), and provides a degree of ﬂexibility to
contributions from channels of assistance by official
agencies to Tanzania with the aim to achieve health
improvements or to finance health-related global public
goods (including research, disease surveillance, moni-
toring and evaluation) that are delivered through gov-
ernment channels. Obtained by extracting DAH projects
from the CRS for 2001e2010 through a mixture of
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took place during the analysis and interpretation phase, using a
technique inﬂuenced by the works of O’Cathain et al., which
involved signiﬁcant iteration between the quantitative and quali-
tative analyses, both to explain the ﬁndings of either method, and
to inform trends or themes to be explored (“following a thread”)
(O’Cathain et al., 2008, 2010).keyword and line-by-line searches and manually re-
coding the channel field to identify funds disbursed
through the government.
9. Development Assistance for Health delivered outside of
the government (DAH-NG): This was calculated by
subtracting DAH-G from total DAH.
10. DAH to HIV: DAH to Tanzania targeted specifically to
HIV/AIDS related activities. Extracted from the CRS,
IHME and AidData databases for 2001e2008 and
manually selected projects targeted to HIV.
11. DAH-G for HIV: DAH-G to Tanzania targeted specifically3.2. Quantitative methods
We present and analyse trends in domestic and external
expenditure at the sector and health sub-sector levels, and the
relative shares each represent of total expenditure. The time period
of analysis was from 2001 to 2010 as a full dataset on expenditures
was only available up until 2010 (2001e2008 for HIV and
2004e2010 for Development Assistance for Health channelled
through the government (DAH-G)). The quantitative indicators
used are summarised in Box 1.Box 1
Quantitative indicators
1. Total Government Expenditure (TGE): Total expendi-
ture channelled through government sources (all sec-
tors). Obtained from the Government of Tanzania’s
Budget Speeches for the years 2001e2010.
2. Government Health Expenditure as a Source (GHE-S):
Government expenditure on health raised domestically.
Calculated by subtracting the estimated proportion of
GBS spent on health from the domestic health expen-
diture reported in the annual health sector Public
Expenditure Review for 2001e2010.
3. Government Health Expenditure as an Agent (GHE-A):
Health expenditure channelled through the government
(GHE-A ¼ GHE-S þ DAH-G). Extracted from the World
Bank’s Tanzania’s Public Expenditure Review for 2001
e2010 and calculated from our own data sources
(please note this is not directly comparable to adding up
GHE-S and DAH-G from the calculations reported in this
paper, see [Supplementary methods and
supplemenatry Table 3].
4. Government expenditure on HIV as a source: Govern-
ment expenditure on HIV raised domestically. Obtained
from the Tanzanian Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Public
Expenditure Review for 2001e2008
5. Government expenditure on HIV as an agent: HIV
expenditure channelled through the government.
Calculated by adding up 4 and 10.
6. Official Development Assistance (ODA): Disbursements
from official agencies administered with the aim of
promoting economic development and welfare that are
concessional (with a grant element of at least 25%)
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment). Obtained from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting
System database for the years 2001e2010. Reported as
a total and for four sectors (health, education, agricul-
ture and water).
7. ODA channelled through the government (ODA-G):
ODA delivered through government channels. Obtained
from the Government of Tanzania’s budget speeches
for 2001e2010.
8. Development Assistance for Health channelled through
the Government (DAH-G): All financial and in-kind
to HIV/AIDS related activities. Extracted from by
selecting HIV projects from DAH-G (see 8).At the sector level we ﬁrst compared expenditure on healthwith
expenditure on other sectors (agriculture, education, health and
water) in relation to total expenditure e Ofﬁcial Development
Assistance (ODA) for external funding and Total Government
Expenditure (TGE) for domestic funding for the period 2001e2010.
These sectors were selected because theywere reported by DPs and
government representatives to be of priority, and are those selected
by the World Bank for their Public Expenditure Review (PER).
We distinguish between government expenditure on health as
an agent (GHE-A), which measures any health expenditure chan-
nelled through the government and government expenditure on
health as a source (GHE-S), which captures health expenditure
from the government revenue earnings. Data on government sector
level expenditure as an agent were obtained from the World Bank
PER (World Bank, 2011). TGE data were obtained from the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania Budget Speeches (Parliament of Tanzania).
One caveat of these data is that government expenditure from the
budget speeches includes external funds channelled through the
government as GBS; given that we compare the relative share of the
different sectors and that we assume GBS is distributed following
budgetary allocations (see below), we made no adjustment for this.
ODA data were obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s Creditor Reporting System (OECD-
CRS). ODA data were classiﬁed into sectors based on the CRS sector
codes, without undertaking any re-coding or adding additional data
from different sources.
We then examined trends in health expenditure channelled
through the government in more detail. We compared trends in
GHE-S and DAH delivered through the government and through
non-government channels (DAH-G and DAH-NG respectively).
GHE-S, DAH-G and DAH-NG were calculated in real terms and as a
proportion of TGE to account for increases in the government’s
budget. DAH-G was also calculated as a proportion of ODA deliv-
ered through the government (ODA-G). ODA-G was extracted from
the Budget Speeches.
Data constraints meant GHE-S was difﬁcult to obtain. Many
studies use World Health Organisation’s National Health Accounts
ﬁgures (NHA) (Farag et al., 2009; Ke et al., 2011; Stuckler et al.,
2011); however, these ﬁgures have been criticised for using
imputation methods that are not standardised (Lu et al., 2010).
Others estimate GHE-S by deducting DAH-G from GHE-A
Table 1
Interview participants.
Stakeholder type In-depth interviews
Government 12
Bi-lateral DP 5
Multi-lateral DP 2
Non-government 3
Total Interviews 22
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GHE-S from the Tanzanian health sector PER (Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare, 2012). The PER distinguishes between GHE-S
(although this includes GBS), DAH delivered as vertical projects
and basket funding. In order to avoid double counting, the pro-
portion of GBS allocated to the health sector was calculated by
assuming it was allocated according to the percentage of govern-
ment expenditure on health (a method previously used by (Powell-
Jackson et al., 2006)) and subtracted it from the GHE-S ﬁgure found
in the PER.
There are three global sources for data on ODA: OECD-CRS,
AidData and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
(IHME) DAH databases (see [ Supplemenetary Methods] for
detailed description). To estimate DAH-G we extracted data from
the CRS and AidData (for DPs not included in the CRS). We did not
include IHME data as it does not contain project-level information.
We classiﬁed projects as DAH using amix of line-by-line coding and
keyword searches. Extensive efforts were used to manually recode
the database to identify DAH-G and DAH-NG (see [ Supplemenetary
methods]). We only re-coded data from 2004 as the data from the
CRS and AidData databases were too incomplete for prior years
[supplementary Fig. 1].
Annual trends on health sub-sector expenditure were only
available for spending on HIV for 2001e2008, and reproductive
health andmalaria for three points in time between 2000 and 2010.
We extracted data on domestic and external expenditure on
reproductive health and malaria from the NHA (as we deemed this
more accurate than the CRS). We extracted data on DAH for HIV
from all three ODA databases by selecting all projects that specif-
ically targeted HIV through a combination of line-by-line coding
and keyword searches (see [Supplementarty methods]). Data on
domestic HIV expenditure and DAH-G for HIV were obtained from
HIV PERs (although these include GBS) (TACAIDS, 2008). External
(DAH and DAH-G for HIV) and domestic expenditure on HIV were
presented as absolute amounts, as a proportion of DAH-G and GHE-
S respectively and as components of government expenditure on
HIV as an agent.
All expenditure ﬁgures were converted to constant 2010 US
dollars using World Bank conversion rates and OECD deﬂators to
allow for comparison of different data sources and to adjust for
inﬂation.
3.3. Qualitative methods
22 interviews were conducted with DPs, government ofﬁcials
from the MoHSW, PMO-RALG, representatives of regional and
council management teams, and non-government stakeholders
during the period of AprileJune 2012 (Table 1). Respondents were
initially sampled purposively to represent stakeholders involved in
health budgeting decisions in Tanzania. Contact-tracing was sub-
sequently used to identify further respondents. No reward was
offered for taking part, which meant one person at the council level
refused to participate. Interviews were conducted by MMA face to
face, in English and lasted for about an hour. When respondents
consented, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Otherwise,
detailed notes were taken and immediately typed up. Government
stakeholders did not give permission to be quoted, therefore their
responses are only included in the narrative.
The transcripts were analysed inductively using thematic con-
tent analysis, which allows for the identiﬁcation and analysis of
themes within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). We used a mix of
deductive and inductive approaches to identify important themes.
We started with three macro-themes, based on the interview guide
and the literature: whether DAH funds are perceived to be fungible,
the reasons and the implications of DAH fungibility in theTanzanian health sector. Within these macro-themes, sub-themes
were identiﬁed inductively. The coding tree was devised by MMA
and approved by all authors. The NVIVO software was used to
manage the data. Constant comparative method (Boeije, 2002) was
used to enhance internal validity, by testing hypotheses from one
part of the data on the others. Deviant case analysis (Silverman,
2013) (exploring cases that ﬁtted and contradicted emerging hy-
potheses) was undertaken to ensure the views of all stakeholders
were represented.
Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethical Review Boards of
the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, the Ifakara
Health Institute and the Tanzanian National Institute of Medical
Research.
4. Results
4.1. Are DAH funds fungible?
4.1.1. Sector substitution
In the time period 2001e2010 TGE increased from $2.5 to $8.2
billion. Over the entire period education was the top government
priority, increasing from $482 million to $1.58 billion and making
up about 20% of TGE. GHE-A had a lower, but similar pattern of
expenditure. It increased in absolute terms, but as a share of TGE it
remained fairly constant at around 8% [Supplementary Table 1 and
Fig. 2]. External ﬁnancing trends were slightly different. The top
priority for external ﬁnancing was initially education from 2001 to
2004 increasing from $59 million to $263 million (18% of ODA in
2004), after which it ﬂuctuated between $95 million and $235
million (8% of ODA in 2010) (see Fig.1b and [ Supplementary Table 1
and Fig. 2]). In contrast, external funds to health increased steadily
10-fold from 2001 to 2010 ($71 million to $742 million), becoming
the biggest external priority at 25% of total ODA by 2010 (Fig.1 and [
Supplementary Fig. 2 and 3]).
Exploring the health sector in more depth, we found GHE-S was
fairly stable at 5e6% of TGE between 2004 and 2006, but slowly
decreased to 4.5% by 2010 (Fig. 2). In contrast, DAH-G experienced a
311% increase (from $142 to $441 million), and as a proportion of
total ODA-G increased from 9% to 44% between 2004 and 2009
(Fig. 2a, [Supplementary Table 2]). DAH-G and DAH-NG were
initially constant as a proportion of TGE, but after 2006 DAH-G
increased whilst DAH-NG decreased (Fig. 2b).
These results show that despite external funding for education
decreasing, the government still managed to keep expenditure on
education at 20% of TGE (Fig. 1a). In contrast, GHE-A remained
constant at 8% of TGE (Fig. 1a), whilst DAH-G increased substan-
tially and GHE-S decreased as a proportion of TGE post 2006
(Fig. 2). This suggests some substitution of domestic resources from
health to education.
When asked about DAH fungibility, different stakeholder groups
had contradicting views. Government respondents on the whole
did not believe the government substituted external funds. The
main reasons given for this were that health was a priority sector
for the government and that GHE-S has been rising steadily.
However, they did acknowledge the government had many
Fig. 1. Sectoral allocation of external and domestic resources in Tanzania in the time period of 2001e2010.
Fig. 2. Trends in GHE-S, DAH-G and DAH-NG in Tanzania in the time period of 2001e2010.
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and agriculture, and one respondent from the central government
admitted education was a higher government priority than health.
In contrast, most DPs believed DAH was fungible because as a
proportion of TGE, GHE-S had actually decreased, often quoting the
Abuja target of allocating 15% of TGE to the health sector as their
expectation for the government (Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS
Tuberculosis and other related infectious diseases, 2001).
“… (the government) share of the total (health expenditure) has
been going down. The general response from ﬁnance is that in
relatively good economic growth, that (as) the overall government
budget is going up, therefore you’re getting a smaller share of a
growing budget. Certainly that’s true, but that is not the idea. I
mean the idea was the Abuja target.” (DP)
Finally, a non-government stakeholder believed substitution
was taking place because they perceived the government’sbehaviour as deliberately reducing its share of the health budget in
response to DAH.
“All the time, of course. That’s how it is. All the money you provide
to the health sector, I mean, the government takes it out in the other
end.” (Non-government)
4.1.2. Health sub-sector substitution
Within the health sector, the increases in DAH-G varied across
different disease areas. DAH-G for HIV and GHE-S for HIV increased
from $23million to $363 million and from $9 million to $18 million
respectively between 2002 and 2010 (Fig. 3a), suggesting some
crowding in. However, the rate of increase differed substantially,
and as DAH-G for HIV increased faster than GHE-S for HIV, gov-
ernment expenditure on HIV as an agent became highly DP-
dependent (GHE-S for HIV has remained below 5% of GHE-A for
HIV since 2007) (Fig. 3b).
Fig. 3. Trends in external and domestic funding for HIV in Tanzania funding comparison between domestic and external sources in the time period of 2001e2010.
M. Martínez Alvarez et al. / Social Science & Medicine 159 (2016) 161e169166Examining the way DAH for HIV was channelled, we found that
only 30e50% was delivered through the government (data not
shown). DAH for HIV delivered through the government as a pro-
portion of DAH-G was initially steady at around 40e50% but
decreased to 11% in 2007, before rising again to 26% in 2008
(Fig. 3b). Decreases in DAH-G for HIV (in absolute numbers and as a
proportion of DAH-G) after 2005 took place at the same time as
decreases in GHE-S for HIV from $18 million to $8 million; and
substantially drive the overall trends in health sector wide expen-
diture. External expenditure on malaria and domestic and external
expenditure on reproductive health increased between 2002 and
2009, whilst domestic funding of malaria stagnated between 2002
and 2005 and decreased in 2009 [Supplementary Fig. 4], suggesting
some substitution of government funding for malaria.
The degree of fungibility of sub-sector funds, both vertical
programmes and (pooled) health basket funds was also discussed
with respondents. DPs perceived HIV funds were fungible, with a
DP suggesting the reason why the government was not spending
more on HIV was the fact that it was heavily funded by DPs.
“I’m sure that the government would spend more on HIV if there
wouldn’t be so much funds from the donors.” (DP)
Equally, a DP funding reproductive health programmes believed
there was evidence of fungibility in this sub-sector, because for
every dollar they invested the government took “a dollar out”.
Interestingly, sub-sector fungibility was not restricted to vertical
programmes. Some DPs reported concerns regarding the addi-
tionality of basket funding, particularly of funds earmarked for
drugs and medical supplies.
“(…) it’s an increasing concern (…) that as the basket fund is going
updspeciﬁcally as basket fund support for drugs and medical
supplies (…)dministry of ﬁnance support for those things have
been going down.” (DP)
As with overall health sector expenditures there was some de-
gree of difference in the deﬁnition of fungibility between re-
spondents. Although some degree of substitution seemed to be
taking place, DPs and non-government stakeholders perceived this
as DAH fungibility, whereas government representatives did not.4.2. What government processes may lead to substitution of funds?
We explored the mechanisms leading to fungibility of DAH
funds in the Tanzanian health sector and sub-sectors with re-
spondents. The answers provided fall under two categories:
rational decision-making and macro-economic factors (debt
servicing).
4.2.1. Rational decision-making
The substitution of government funds can take place at two
stages during the budget allocation process: during negotiations of
each sector for resources from the central government and during
the health sector allocation of its funds. When asked about the ﬁrst
phase, respondents identiﬁed the Ministry of Finance as being the
government institution with overall power to decide on budgeting
priorities. Respondents reported that during the budgeting process
there was competition between the different ministries, and the
fact that health was seen as favoured by external resources reduces
its bargaining power.
“… the Ministry (of ﬁnance) has been responding (to questions
about fungibility) by saying that the government thinks that the
Ministry of Health is privileged with many donors who are ready to
help, and that there are other ministries which are not as privi-
leged.” (Non-government)
Many respondents described the government’s behaviour as
“playing a wait and see game”, ﬁrst establishing how much DPs
allocate to health and reallocating its resources accordingly. Indeed,
a non-government respondent believed DAH fungibility was
exacerbated by DP earmarking, which resulted in the government
re-directing its resources to areas that cannot be funded externally.
“… (if) you’ve got something (…) that is a priority of yours but you
can’t get an ‘X’ amount of money for, then obviously, you’re going to
try and shift your own money more into those areas, while the
donors fund the areas which are attractive to them.” (Non-
government)
Although many respondents discussed substitution of domestic
funds with concern, a DP perceived this to be rational decision-
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planning.
“I would always think if you’re looking at it from a household
perspective, if your child for example is offered a scholarship, then
you are not going to just continue spending as much money on
tuition fees as you would have if the scholarship wouldn’t have
been there.” (DP)
The second stage of resource allocation took place during the
health SWAP dialogue, where DPs, government and non-
government stakeholders were present. Respondents reported
that DPs and the government arrived at the SWAP budget process
with misaligned priorities, resulting in a process of negotiations.
Government respondents acknowledged the government takes
into consideration which sub-sectors receive DP funding before
allocating its own resources. Interestingly, despite DPs discussing
fungibility of sub-sector funds with concern, when allocating bas-
ket resources with respect to other external funds, DPs “coordi-
nated” the basket to avoid duplication.
“Also malaria is a priority, but the Global Fund provide a lot of
funding for it, so (government and DPs) discuss on other priorities.
Why put money into malaria if the Global Fund will? It would be a
waste of (the) basket fund.” (Anonymous)4.2.2. DAH fungibility and debt servicing
Substitution was not always perceived to be a deliberate policy
from the government as a response to external ﬁnancing. A non-
government stakeholder attributed reductions of the domestic
health budget as a result of macro-economic factors, such as debt
repayment.
“ (…) this year (…) debt servicing is taking the lead (…) I wouldn’t
say that is (…) the reason the government is not prioritizing health,
but maybe that would indicate that the government is forced to
prioritize its ﬁnancing in sectors other than health.” (Non-
government)
In fact, in a letter to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
December of 2011 (International Monetary Fund, 2011), the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania acknowledged experiencing a higher deﬁcit
than planned and pledged to take ﬁscal measures and to cut costs in
the “decentralisation program for social programs”.
A reduced health budget was also perceived to have resulted in
policymakers re-adjusting sub-sector expenditure. One DP
explained that once they met all their recurrent costs, the MoHSW
had limited ﬂexibility on the areas where they could cut their
budget.
“(the government) doesn’t have that much ﬂexibility in their budget
and (drugs and medical supplies) is one of their areas of ﬂexibility
…” (DP)
This DP felt that this lack of ﬂexibility explained the budget cuts
for drugs and medical supplies reported above, rather than a
deliberate response to an increased contribution from the basket
fund to this area.4.3. Efforts to curb DAH fungibility
Although DPs reported understanding the reasons for govern-
ment substitution of funds, they were nonetheless worried and feltit had consequences for DP-government relationships and DP
funding decisions. For instance, a DP who was concerned about the
additionality of their vertical programmes reported that substitution
would result in DPs withdrawing their funds.
“(…) if I’m playing devil’s advocate I would say (substitution)’s a
smart thing to do. But at what point does it then have political, non-
tangible results, that people stop putting in their dollar?” (DP)
DPs have therefore adopted three different strategies to prevent
fungibility from taking place. First, in an effort to increase health
sector funding they have retained control of their resources by
earmarking their funds and delivering them as pooled basket funds
or projects, rather than unmarked GBS, which could be re-directed
to other sectors by the government (although this does not prevent
the government from substituting its own funds).
“At one time (DPs) wanted to move away from (the) basket fund to
GBS, but they realised it would be a tragedy for the health sector.
The Ministry of Finance (has) many children to feed.” e
(Anonymous)
Indeed, according to CRS data GBS increased from $52 to $762
million between 2002 and 2009 before decreasing to $451 million
in 2010.
Second, at the time of ﬁeldwork (2012), DPs were reported to
have attached conditions for matched funding from the govern-
ment to their funds to ensure DAH was additional. However, not
everyone agreed with this practice, as one non-government
respondent explained, it is against the Paris Declaration’s princi-
ple of country ownership (OECD, 2005).
“… (DPs) are trying to force the government to (match) the amount
of money (…) they put into the drugs budget. But I think that goes
right against (the) Paris (Declaration); that it should be for the
government to decide. Because essentially if the government (were)
to put more money into drugs (…) that money would be coming
from something else. And that means (…) they would have to
reduce the number of staff (…); or (…) take it from other areas of
supplies (…)” (Anonymous)
Third, knowing that funding decisions are taken by the Ministry
of Finance, DPs have supported the MoHSW in their negotiation of
their budget.
“They (the MOHSW) said, ‘We’re going to meet with the Ministry of
Finance to make our case for more resources’. So we provided them
with a letter from the development partners (that) said, ‘Wehave an
expectation that you put more money into the health sector.’” (DP)
In this particular case (in the 2012 budget) the MoHSWwas able
to make a case to receive more funding, although it is impossible to
know the extent towhich the DP letter played a part in that decision.
Overall, respondents had doubts regarding the success of these
strategies, and were unsure whether there was anything DPs can
actually do to stop DAH substitution, except for withdrawing their
funds.
“(…) there is nothing (DPs) can do to stop the government from
behaving the way it is behaving. Then one would (…) propose that
donors cut their assistance. If by donor putting in more money the
government reduces its (funding to health), then the opposite is
also true.” (Non-government)
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DPs withdraw their funds. However, DPs did not agree this would
be the case. One DP interviewed was unsure withdrawing DAH
would provide “an incentive for the government” to increase
budgetary allocation to the health sector or whether it would
simply result in “bad outcomes”.
5. Discussion
This paper explored the degree of DAH fungibility in Tanzania,
and the causes and implications of government substitution of
domestic funds. We found expenditure patterns consistent with
DAH fungibility, but our results suggest this is a result of the
interplay of misaligned priorities and a resource-allocation process
under scarcity. Our ﬁndings suggest the displaced funds may be
going to education, rather than non-social sectors.
The expenditure tracking results suggest that from a broad so-
cial sector perspective there is no evidence of displacement of
government ﬁnancing across sectors between 2001 and 2010.
When examining sector-level expenditures, we found DPs initially
favoured education, but switched to health around 2004, whereas
the government favoured education and agriculture throughout.
We ﬁnd a pattern of expenditure for and within the health sector
that is consistent with fungibility, primarily occurring in more
recent years and aligned with an increase in DAH. Our qualitative
results generally support this, with DPs and non-government
stakeholders describing DAH doing “a dollar in a dollar out” and
the government (although denied they substituted DAH) describing
a process of resource allocation where it decided how much to
allocate to the different priorities once it knewwhat resourceswere
available. The literature on DAH fungibility also supports this, with
cross-country studies ﬁnding DAH displaces government funding
for health (Dieleman and Hanlon, 2013; Ke, Saksena and Holl, 2011;
Lu et al., 2010; Mishra and Newhouse, 2007) and Farag et al. (2009),
who concluded DPs prioritise health more than the government.
We found mixed results from the sub-sector analyses; whilst
quantitative data suggest there was no fungibility of HIV external
ﬁnancing (also supported by two studies in the literature (Garg
et al., 2012; Harper, 2012)), participants believed HIV, reproduc-
tive health and basket funding were all fungible.
We identiﬁed two mechanisms leading to DAH fungibility. First
(andmostly assumed in the literature), as a deliberate policy during
the sector and sub-sector resource allocation processes. Although
displacement of domestic health ﬁnancing is generally perceived to
be harmful in the literature, both in the short and long term
(Dieleman and Hanlon, 2013; Farag et al., 2009), we ﬁnd the
behaviour of the government to be in line with economic theory
(also discussed by Dieleman and Hanlon (2013)). If the Government
of Tanzania aims to maximise welfare, and receives funds ear-
marked for health but not for other sectors, it could be expected to
re-allocate its own resources to other social sectors. Often there
would be concern about government expenditure decreases to
non-social sectors, but we found no evidence of this. If DPs are also
trying tomaximise thewelfare of the recipient population, then the
reallocation of government resources differently across the social
sectors may not be necessarily harmful. In addition, we found
broader macro-economic policies, such as debt servicing, lead to
substitution. This is in accordance with Stuckler et al. (2011), who
found DAH was more fungible in countries that borrowed money
from the IMF than those that did not.
A further interesting ﬁnding is that by insisting their funds are
additional, DPs expect the government to coordinate domestic re-
sources differently to how they coordinate external resources. DPs
coordinate basket fund resources by not investing them in areas
like malaria, which is funded by the Global Fund e a behaviour thatmay be described as “fungible” if done by the government. In fact,
two recent studies in three countries and at the global level have
found DP substitutionwith increases in DAH to HIV displacing DAH
to other health priorities (Garg et al., 2012; Shiffman, 2008). It
would therefore be worth investigating further the existence and
impact of DP substitution, particularly at the country level.
Finally, reﬂecting on whether anything can and should be done
to inﬂuence government resource allocation to prevent DAH
fungibility, we found that it may not be necessarily perverse to
Tanzania’s development. This is supported by some authors, who
have argued substitution may be rational (McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2000; Waddington, 2004), and two studies which
found no difference between the impact fungible and non-fungible
aid has on growth (Pettersson, 2007) or on under-ﬁve mortality
(Wagstaff, 2011). In contrast, others have expressed concerns
regarding the non-additionality of DAH (Lu et al., 2010), or cor-
ruption if DAH is displaced from the government coffers (Lahiri and
Raimondos-Moller, 2004). We found DAH fungibility was detri-
mental to DP-government relationships and therefore worth
addressing.
Our ﬁndings suggest the three strategies used by DPs in
Tanzania to prevent fungibility have not been successful. We did
not ﬁnd any substantial difference in the government’s response to
different development assistance modalities, suggesting DPs’ ear-
marking of DAH may not prevent its substitution, in line with
Waddington’s conclusion that fungibility actually decreases the
effectiveness of earmarking (Waddington, 2004). DPs’ requests for
matching of funds are against the principle of country ownership of
international declarations (OECD, 2005) and were criticised by in-
country stakeholders for having the potential to cause harm if
essential services were cut as a result. Finally, the suggestion of
some non-government respondents for DPs to withdraw their
funding has already been shown empirically to not result in
increased government funding for health (Dieleman and Hanlon,
2013).
There is no consensus in the literature on how best to tackle
DAH fungibility, with recommendations from studies generally
discussing whether DPs should work with governments (Lu et al.,
2010; Sridhar and Woods, 2010), do so through innovative
ﬁnancing mechanisms (Farag et al., 2009), or improve current
mechanisms of working with governments (Dieleman and Hanlon,
2013; Stuckler et al., 2011). We support the latter group of authors
and recommend DPs to better engage in the dialogue with the
government, not just at the level of the health sector but also at the
macro-economic level with the Ministry of Finance, and jointly
decide who will ﬁnance which priorities. We would also recom-
mend agencies take into account countries’ ﬁscal health when
requesting match-funding agreements.
This research has several methodological limitations. Quanti-
tative data were obtained from different sources to select the most
complete set of data. However, DAH ﬁgures obtained from the CRS
will be an underestimate because regional projects were not
included; domestic and external HIV expenditures are also an un-
derestimate because they do not include broader health system
expenditures; and in general the completeness of the CRS has
improved in recent years, making later data more reliable. The
shorter period of data availability for HIV (2000e2008) and DAH-G
(2004e2009) also limited our ability to make conclusions during
earlier years of the analysis. Domestic data were hard to obtain. We
used sources we considered most complete and government
sanctioned, but were unable to check for inaccuracies as data were
only available as aggregates. However, we believe our method of
estimating GHE-S is more accurate (although resource intensive)
than those used in the fungibility literature becausewewere able to
base them on estimates of government expenditure as a source
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ysis also has some limitations. First is the absence of the voice of the
Government of Tanzania. Although representatives from different
government agencies took part in the study, they did not consent to
be recorded or directly quoted. We have presented their perspec-
tives in the narrative of this paper, but the quotes are predomi-
nantly from DPs and non-government stakeholders. Second,
interviews were conducted in English, which may have inﬂuenced
how comfortable respondents felt in sharing their views. Third,
MMA conducted all the interviews, and may have inﬂuenced both
the data generated and how it was analysed. Finally, given that
fungibility is context speciﬁc, there may be questions about the
generalisability of the results reported here. We hope our ﬁndings
are useful to countries with similar government and DP structures
and to the wider research community to interpret the results from
cross-country models.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this research has provided
an insight into fungibility from the perspective of a recipient
country. Our approach of analysing trends in ﬁnancing in combi-
nation with a qualitative exploration of the perceptions of national
stakeholders can provide useful information on the drivers and
consequences of substitution, rather than a binary answer of
whether it is taking place. Future cross-country studies of DAH
fungibility would beneﬁt from taking a broader macro-economic
perspective that includes other sectors in their analysis. Although
data on government expenditure are limited, IMF and World Bank
databases contain sectoral expenditures, and the CRS provides ODA
disbursements for all sectors. It would be particularly interesting to
investigate the amount of government expenditure that is dis-
placed to debt repayments to international ﬁnancial institutions, as
well as the degree of displacement to other social sectors. Finally,
we feel further research is most needed to qualitatively understand
fungibility. This paper takes a ﬁrst step, but further country and
sector-speciﬁc case studies are needed to construct a body of evi-
dence to understand the impact of fungibility and whether and
how it should be tackled.
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